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sent constitution, to provide for the trial of titles to land in equity
in the cases which were triable at law at the time the constitution
was adopted:" Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 322. It seems that this
objection might be obviated by giving the parties the right to have
the issues.tried by a. jury, and providing that the verdict of the
jury should be as binding and conclusive as it would be at law.
In conclusion it may be said that it is claimed that these statutes
are to be construed equitably, and that relief will be denied if the
particular circumstances of the case indicate the absence of equity
in complainant's demand for the relief sought. This may be best
illustrated by a case decided by the Supreme Court of Kansas. A
party filed his bill to quiet his title against the holder of a tax-sale
certificate, alleging certain defects that invalidated the sale. The
court conceded that the defects alleged were sufficient to invalidate
the sale, but nevertheless dismissed the bill for the reason that he
who seeks equity must first do equity. " Counsel contends," said
the court, "that because the action is authorized by and brought
under the statute, it is not subject to equitable principles ; but this
is a mistake." The want of equity, as the court thought, con-
sisted in the fact that the complainant justly owed the tax, and
should have offered in his bill to pay the same.
Where a bill to quiet title was based upon a tax title and limita-
tion, but failed to show affirmatively the proceedings, and when
possession of the land and payment of the taxes under the title
commenced, or how it was continued, merely charging generally
possession and payment of taxes for the statutory period, the bill
was dismissed as not being sufficiently specific.
HENRY WADE ROGERS.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
THERE iS, I believe, a growing conviction among the jurists of
the present day, that the law of punitive or exemplary damages has
been built upon a wrong foundation, and is alike contrary to prin-
ciple and evil in its effects. I share deeply in this feeling, and in
the hope of effecting something, however little, toward a reform,
would willingly add a few words to what was once a much dis-
cusse I question.
EXEMIPLARY DAMAGES.
It is the aim of the common law in cases where damages are
proper, to give complete redress, so far as this can be estimated in
a pecuniary way. Whatever the practical result may be, the law
does not confess its inability to give just compensation, nor aban-
don the theory that the remedy is sufficient. The controversy has
been with reference to the proper rule of damages in cases of
aggravated torts.
A few of our courts in this country maintain, that the proof of
malicious motives forms a basis for special or extraordinary com-
pensation, to cover not only the natural and legal results of the
tort, but as near as can be estimated, damages for mental or physi-
cal pain, anxiety or distress, or degradation, which actually resulted
from the act. But in the rulings of these courts which uphold the
system of exemplary or vindictive damages, a radical difference is
made between ordinary torts, and cases where there is fraud, wil-
ful negligence, or actual malice on the part of the defendant-the
rule not confining the jury to simple compensation, but allowing
them to give such further damages "as will mark their sense of
the injustice and insult done to the plaintiff, as a punishment upon
the defendant, and as a wholesome example to the community."
We find these words in substance used again and again by the
courts of this country, until their continued repetition, unaccom-
panied by explanation, tries the ear. The judges seemingly
endeavor to evade the responsibility and inconsistency of the doc-
trine, by parroting the expression of others. The position taken
by those who, like Mr. Sedgwick (Sedgwick on Damages 573,
note, 6th ed.), and DILLON, J. (Berry v. Fletcher, 1 Dillon 67),
have the vigor to assert an open opinion is, that it is only just to
the outraged sense of the community, that the defendant should be
assessed such a farther sum, beyond compensation, in proportion
to his wealth as will relieve the sting of insult, and deter the
defendant from a repetition of the offence. The fact, that the
assessment goes to the plaintiff is incidental, and subservient to
the necessity of giving an example to the community, and of
punishing the defendant.
This, in a few words, is the principle of the doctrine of exem-
plary damages. To us it seems to have arisen under a mistaken
idea, and as a result of unadvised dicta and incompetent reasoning.
It is quite well established in this country, though the tendency of
some modern decisions is to repudiate it altogether. Some courts
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recognise the inconsistency, white they yield to the authority of
precedents: Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282; Smitwick v.
Ward, 7 Jones, L. R. (N. C.) 64.
The difficulty of estimating compensation for intangible injuries,
was the cause of the rise of this doctrine; the hardship of particu-
lar cases was the pretext; and without comprehending the exten-
sive consequences, the judges of our courts have, perhaps uninten-
tionally, allowed their sympathy for mental distress to overpower
the principles of the law. There can be no doubt, that there are
cases arising, which require extraordinary remedy beyond the mere
money loss; and when the early judges allowed the jury discretion
to assess beyond the pecuniary damage, there being no apparent
computation, it was natural to suppose that the excess was imposed
as a punishment. The courts in subsequent cases took this view,
and in many instances were, no doubt, deceived by the indigna-
tion expressed in terms so strongly against the defendant, as to
give rise to the idea that the damages were punitive.
In spite of the dicta of the courts and the able views of Mr.
Sedgwick (Law Reporter, April and June 1847) and other jurists,
I do not think that such damages can be sustained on principle.
The arguments of Judge NELSON of New Hampshire (Fay v.
Parker, 58 N. H. 342), and Mr. Greenleaf (2 Gr. on Evidence,
235, note, 13th ed.), are more conclusive; and it must become
more and more evident to careful thinkers, that the doctrine is
unsound, and if carried to its legitimate results, that it would be
very disastrous. It might seem at first sight (and some writers
have taken this view: Hilliard on Remedies for Torts 440, note
a; Field on Damages 70), that the distinction between exem-
plary damages, and damages given as special or extraordinary
compensation, is one of words merely; and the effect of allowing
the former, is the same as that produced upon the theory of com-
pensation, when this is extended to cover injury beyond the pecu-
niary loss. If this is true, which I believe it is very far from
being, the terms "exemplary" and "punitive" damages, are
certainly very ill chosen; for it leads the jury, however much
restrained in theory, to make the estimate of damages, with a view
to punish the defendant rather than compensate the plaintiff: Hen-
drickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379.
But the distinction is more than one of words. The jury under
the one instruction, would be liable to go beyond the ends of
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justice. Under the system of exemplary damages, 
they are
instructed to give not only compensation, but are allowed 
to punish
the defendant with a further sum; and it is expressly held, 
that
evidence of his pecuniary ability, is admissible to guide the 
jury
in estimating what sum must be assessed against him to make 
the
punishment effective: Guengerech v. Smith, 34 Iowa 348 ; Buck-
ley v. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152.
Under the principle that damages should never be given beyond
compensation, the jury is instructed to estimate the entire 
injury,
taking into consideration the mental anxiety and distress, 
as well
as pecuniary loss, and to give full compensation for all of the 
injury
which defendant's malicious act has caused; and beyond this, 
not
one cent. The result is very different. The jury in the 
latter
case deal with the question as one of remedy, and not of criminal
fine.
And it is difficult to see how, under the established system, any
reasonable restraint can be on principle imposed on the jury. 
It
is said, that the court may set aside the verdict, if it is unreason-
ably large; but in such cases it is found, that when the judge
comes to consider the verdict, he practically looks to the doctrine
of actual compensation, which is supposed to be for the time being
discarded. The conclusion is, that if the verdict is allowed 
to
stand, it is because it corresponds to the theory of the advocates
of compensation, and that of exemplary damages has been practi-
cally disregarded. NELSON, J., in Tay v. Parker, before cited,
shows, that under the latter doctrine there is no inconsistency 
in
compensating the plaintiff four times over.
In the case of Markham v. -, reported in 2 Erskine's
Speeches, p. 9, the great barrister Erskine shows, that the words
of Lord KENYON have been misinterpreted, and never authorized
the incorporation of criminal remedies into civil procedure. 
It
seems to me, that the mingling of the criminal principles with the
civil, which the doctrine necessitates, is altogether wrong. And even
if it be allowable to fine the defendants in a civil court, there seems
no reason why the plaintiff should be the recipient. It is difficult to
see why a man should receive a fine, to which he is not entitled in
right as compensation. If the plaintiff is entitled to damages as a
matter of right, let him receive them in their proper character of
indemnity; if he is not so entitled, there is no power in any
government which can justly deprive another of his property for
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plaintiff's benefit. Judicial procedure ought not to be made a cover
for the confiscation of private property.
The attempt has been made to bring the doctrine within the
constitutional provision, that "no person shall be subject for the
same offence, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ;" and
though according to the strict rules of interpretation, the objec-
tion is not well made, yet the spirit of our institutions would seem
to forbid a civil fine for an offence which could be punished crimi-
nally (Austin v. Wilson, 4 Cush. 275). As to its being a matter
which public benefit justifies, Lord Commissioner ADAM of Scot-
land, has said, "a civil court in matters of civil injury is a bad
corrector of morals; it has only to do with the rights of the par-
ties :" Beattie v. Bryson, 1 Murr. R. 317.
If the theory of punishment is to be carried out, consistency
would require, that the amount charged to the defendant should
be divided into two parts-the one to be awarded to the injured
party as compensation, the other to be paid to the state as in cases
of criminal fine. And, moreover, there never was the necessity
for this doctrine which eminent judges have supposed. There is
indeed this much of justice in it, that in particular cases it furn-
ished a means of redressing wrong, when there seemed no other
expedient at hand; and which, though contrary to principle, was
sufficiently effectual. A good result has been often obtained by it,
but a comprehensive application of the theory of compensation,
would accomplish every purpose in a much more rational manner:
Meagher v. -Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281; Fillebbrown v. Hoar, 124 Id.
580. There is no impracticability in calling upon a jury to esti-
mate the damages with reference to the full injury sustained,
taking into consideration not only direct and indirect pecuniary
loss, but also the hurt done to the finer instincts of human nature.
If an insult is contemplated, the injury is greater on that account.
If the act proceeded from mala mens or malice, this fact has caused
mental anxiety and vexation, perhaps disgrace, which can be
accounted for in money.
And, as is undoubtedly the truth, if in many cases any pecuni-
ary compensation is, from the nature of things, essentially inade-
quate, the courts should not be either deterred thereby from
coming as near as possible to complete compensation, or be made
the means of inflicting a criminal fine for injury which the defend-
ant has not caused. The maxim "causa proxima, non remota
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spectatur," should apply here as elsewhere, and the defendant be
made liable to the extent that the injury is the result of his wrong,
and no further.
There is no doubt extensive authority in this country to sustain
the doctrine of exemplary damages, but I question very much
whether it is as overwhelming as is generally supposed. Dicta
will be found probably in every state which seem to support the
principle; but we are apt to be misled by mere words. Mr.
Greenleaf criticises with considerable success, the authorities chiefly
relied on by Sedgwick, and his reasoning will apply to a great many
other and later cases, which he has not touched: 2 Greenleaf on
Evidence 235, 13th ed.
There is a large class of decisions supporting the doctrine super-
ficially, which upon analysis, really go no farther than to authorize
extraordinary compensation. The courts speak of "damages
beyond compensation," but by the latter word, or "actual compen-
sation," as some have called it, they mean to cover simply the
pecuniary loss proved at the trial. That something beyond this
should in certain cases be given, every one acknowledges; they
call it " exemplary damages," but it is compensation, in spite of
the misnomer.
The spirit of these decisions, however ill-chosen the words may
be, is undoubtedly not in favor of "punishing" the defendant
beyond full indemnity. When the courts speak of giving damages
"as compensation to the plaintiff, and an example to the commu-
nity," it is a ridiculous misuse of words and goes no farther.
Compensation is given because the plaintiff is entitled to it, inde-
pendent of the effect upon the public. That the assessment often
does operate as a punishment, and an example, is purely incidental.
Yet the courts have followed the letter rather than the spirit of
decisions, and have deceived the judges in after cases by their mis-
use of terms ; while the latter conceive themselves more bound by
authority, than reason. This, in a word, is the history of exem-
plary damages in nearly every state where they can be said to be
established.
Of the class of cases above spoken of, Linsley v. Bushnell, 15
Conn. 225, is a fair illustration. In that case, the court elaborates
upon the necessity of full and adequate compensation, in distinc-
tion from the mere taxable costs. Malone v. Murphy, 2 Kan.
262, decided in Kansas; is another similar case; and the dictum
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is for exemplary damages, as long as they do not conflict with the
theory of actual compensation.
A careful review of authorities shows, that of those states com-
monly considered as adhering to the doctrine, there are several
where a vigorous decision in favor of simple compensation would
be justifiable in view of precedent, as following the spirit rather
than the words of the decisions. This was the condition of things
in New Hampshire, before the case of Pay v. Parker fixed the
position of that state beyond question.
Among the states which now stand in this middle position, I
think I can with reasonable certainty name California (Wilson v.
Middleton, 2 Cal. 54; Dorsey v. Manlove, 14 Id. 553; Selden v.
Coshman, 20 Id. 56), in this state the subject is now regulated by
statute; Connecticut (Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 225, 267);
Indiana (Millisoan v. Hoch, 17 Ind. 227, but contra Shafer v. Smith,
1 Cent. L. J. 271); Iowa (Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379);
Kansas (Malone v. Murphy, 2 Kan. 262; Hefley v. Baker, 19 Id.
9; Titus v. Uorkins, 21 Id. 722); Michigan (Welch v. Ware, 32
Mich. 77; Daily Post v. AeArthur, 16 Id. 447); Maine (Pike v.
Dilling, 48 Me. 539); and Texas (Cole v. Tucker, 6 Texas 266).
On the other hand, there are several states where there seems
no fair opportunity for doubt, that they are completely committed
to the doctrine. Of these are New York, Alabama, Illinois,
Kentucky, Maryland, Vermont and Missouri.' The position
of the Federal Courts is hard to define. Most of the cases
usually cited, do not touch the point. The strongest United
States dicta are in Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363; and Berry
v. Fletcher, 1 Dillon 67.
There are some states which clearly and satisfactorily limit
damages to compensation. It is a relief to find a healthful practi-
cal view, among the many vacillating and contradictory decisions.
Massachusetts (Barnard v. Poor, 21 Pick. 378; Austin v. Wil-
son, 4 Cush. 273) and Nevada (Johnson v. Wells, Fargo & Co.,
6 Nev. 224; Quigley v. C. P. Railroad Co., 11 Id. 350), have
consistently taken this stand; and New Hampshire is now, as we
have seen, classed with them.
The preponderance of authorities is, however, in favor of exem-
I For full citation of authorities in these states, see Field on Damages, p. 24;
Meidel v. Anthis, 71 Ill. 241 ; Miller v. Kirby, 74 Id. 242.
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plary damages. It is a great mistake which should be corrected,
either by legislative enactment or the law-making power of the
courts. For the doctrine is productive of positive evil. "1It has
demoralized an honorable profession by the prizes held out to the
litigious and unscrupulous, and their advocates in court expecting
to share in the promised confiscation of another man's property :"
(6 Cent. L. J., p. 74). There would be fewer damage suits filling
up the dockets of our courts with useless, or else unrightful litiga-
tion, if plaintiffs could recover only what they have suffered ; and
the courts would not be obliged to resort to the thin fiction of
"public example," in order to make reparation for the ruin of
character and destruction of homes, brought about by slanders and
seducers. The reproach upon our law, that it compensates for the
loss of the slightest service, but not for the severance of the dearest
ties, or the ruin of human happiness, would not exist.
In a late Nevada case, Quigley v. Central Pacific Railroad Co.,
11 Nev. 350, the consideration of the question is thorough and
satisfactory; and the words of BEATTY, J., therein reported, accord
so closely with my views of what is right upon this subject, that
they may be taken as an appropriate conclusion, and apt expres-
sion of what it has been the aim of this article to establish: "As
to the question whether a jury in awarding vindictive damages,
can go beyond a full compensation to the plaintiff for his pecuniary
loss, and bodily and mental suffering, and add a further sum by
way, of punishment to the defendant, for the sake of example, I
think the weight of reason and the best considered cases are in
favor of restricting the award to compensation to the plaintiff.
Of course the amount of compensation to which he will be entitled,
will depend, in every case, upon the circumstances of the injury;
and in cases of gross and wanton outrage, heavy damages should
be allowed, which, while they would go to the plaintiff as a com-
pensation, would operate incidentally as a severe punishment to
the defendant. In this sense and in this sense only, in my opin-
ion, is it proper to say that a defendant may be punished in vindic-
tive damages."
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